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ABSTRACT: This article places the origins of the Maji Maji rebellion in Southeast
Tanzania within the context of tensions between coast and interior, and between
‘big man’ leaders and their followers, which grew out of the expansion of trade and
warfare in the second half of the nineteenth century. Without discounting its im-
portance as a reaction against colonial rule, the paper argues that the rebellion was
driven also by the ambitions of local leaders and by opposition to the expansion
of indigenous coastal elites. The crucial role of the ‘Maji ’ medicine as a means of
mobilization indicates the vitality of local politics among the ‘stateless’ people of
Southeast Tanzania.
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THE Maji Maji rebellion, which shook German East Africa in 1905–7,
was among the most dramatic and catastrophic anti-colonial uprisings in
early colonial Africa. In its largest battles, the rebels counted in thousands.
The German colonial government, although caught unawares, soon put
together a brutal response. The number of dead, more often from the eﬀects
of German scorched earth strategies than from ﬁghting, is unknown, but
certainly reached tens, and possibly hundreds, of thousands. From its out-
break, the causes and organization of the rebellion became subject to intense
speculation, prompted not least by the role in it of the ‘Maji’. This medicine,
apparently connected to a water cult on the Ruﬁji River, was administered to
the ﬁghters by priest-like messengers from its shrines.
Research on the Maji Maji rebellion has developed ﬁtfully over the last
35 years. In 1967–9, the Maji Maji research project, a collaboration between
Tanzanian students and British scholars, established a base line for its histori-
ography.1 Beginning with the amazement of contemporary observers at the
unity of purpose and persistence in struggle displayed by the rebels, many of
whom belonged to peoples considered ‘unwarlike’ and parochial, research
focused on the motivation and organization of the rebellion. The interpret-
ations followed many leads, but centred on yearning for political indepen-
dence as a central motive and the unifying role of the ‘Maji ’ medicine cult
and its messengers.
1 Gilbert Gwassa and John Iliﬀe (eds.), ‘Papers of the Maji Maji Research Project’
(MMRP) (2 vols.) (Dar es Salaam, 1968–9).
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After the accounts of the rebellion based on this project were published,2
the topic lay almost untouched until the 1990s when Marcia Wright,
Thaddeus Sunseri and Jamie Monson set out new interpretations of the
rebellion in sub-regions of the area it aﬀected.3 These regional studies elab-
orated onmany aspects ofMajiMaji present in the earlier research, especially
the grievances against German rule which motivated it, its continuity with
earlier conﬂicts and the various local antecedents of the ‘Maji ’ medicine. In
addition, they challenged the previous emphasis on the innovative qualities
and the unifying capacity of the Maji cult, sometimes to the point of
questioning the importance of the medicine altogether. The criticism cul-
minated in the claim that the earlier historiography had misrepresented
the rebellion as a form of proto-nationalism, in eﬀect furnishing material
for the ideological foundations of the independent Tanzanian state.
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Map 1. Southeast Tanzania in 1905/6.
2 Most relevant here, John Iliﬀe, ‘The organisation of theMaji Maji rebellion’, Journal
of African History, 8 (1967), 495–512; Gilbert Gwassa, ‘Kinjikitile and the ideology of
Maji Maji ’, in Terence Ranger and Isaria N. Kimambo (eds.), The Historical Study of
African Religion (London, 1972), 202–18; John Iliﬀe, A Modern History of Tanganyika
(Cambridge, 1979), 168–98.
3 Marcia Wright, ‘Maji Maji: prophecy and historiography’, in David Anderson and
Douglas Johnson (eds.), Revealing Prophets: Prophecy in East African History (London,
1995), 124–42; Thaddeus Sunseri, ‘Famine and wild pigs: gender struggles and the
outbreak of the Maji Maji war in Uzaramo (Tanzania) ’, Journal of African History,
38 (1997), 235–59; Jamie Monson, ‘Relocating Maji Maji: the politics of alliance and
authority in the southern Highlands of Tanzania’, Journal of African History, 39 (1998),
95–120.
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The attempt to tone down the quasi-nationalist overtones of former in-
terpretations focused on three aspects of the rebellion. First, Wright, Sunseri
and Monson all questioned the pivotal role of the central sites and prophets
of the Maji cult, by suggesting alternative, local or domestic, origins and
interpretations of the medicine. Secondly, they emphasized local and prac-
tical grievances against German rule, rather thanMaji messengers and quasi-
nationalist ideology, as a motivating force. Thirdly, they emphasized the
continuity of the rebellion with earlier wars in this region, as opposed to what
they saw as an excessive emphasis in the earlier writings on central organiz-
ation, conscious innovation and ideological commitment among followers of
the Maji.
Arguably, the greatest merit of this second wave of research lies in opening
the way towards highlighting the importance of conﬂicts and tensions among
the peoples of the region, rather than presenting the rebellion as a conﬂict
of colonized against colonizers. This is the starting point of the following
reconsideration ofMajiMaji in the southeast, an area not studied byMonson,
Sunseri or Wright. It focuses on regional rather than local dynamics and
links them to tensions among diﬀerent strata of indigenous society. In ad-
dition, it does not share all their reservations about the ﬁrst wave of Maji
Maji research. While the contemporaneous ideas of modernization and
nationalism undoubtedly inﬂuenced Gwassa’s and Iliﬀe’s writings on Maji
Maji, much of the information presented in later interpretations, especially
on the local dynamics of the rebellion, is fully compatible with their accounts.
Moreover, the roots of Maji in agricultural or healing practices do not rule
out the possibility that it also functioned as a means of political mobilization.
This article seeks to relate the Maji Maji rebellion to the politics that grew
up around the expansion of trade and warfare in Southeast Tanzania in the
nineteenth century and to the attendant struggles for survival and oppor-
tunity, symbolic and material, that these circumstances produced.4 The
ﬁfteen years of German rule that preceded the rebellion had suﬃced to make
the Germans an enemy to most people in the area, but not to obliterate the
social and political dynamics that predated their arrival. In the second half of
the nineteenth century, Southeast Tanzania had been an insecure environ-
ment, subject to periodic invasions by migrant Ngoni warriors and traversed
by slave caravans destined for the biggest slave-exporting port of the era,
Kilwa. Its inhabitants had had to adjust to living with a mixture of danger
and opportunity epitomized by the Ngoni on one hand and the wealth of
coastal patricians on the other. Political leadership had become bound up
with the ability to manipulate resources along the trade routes and alternately
to protect and exploit one’s followers.
THE ‘BIG MEN’: WAR, TRADE AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST
TANZANIA BEFORE MAJI MAJ I
The area dealt with here is roughly circumscribed by the coast in the east, the
Ruﬁji River in the north, the Luvegu River in the east and the Rovuma River
4 See Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion and Popular Conscious-
ness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888 (Portsmouth and London, 1995).
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in the south.5 In contrast to the highly organized Ngoni to the west, and to
the centralized polities to the northwest, the people here had a loose, small-
scale social organization of a kind often referred to as ‘stateless’. With the
exception of the Matumbi, inhabitants of the eponymous hills in the Kilwa
hinterland, they were at the time of the uprising also considered quite
unwarlike and weak; this was especially true for the Ngindo, the inhabitants
of Liwale, the open woodlands between the Luvegu River (which in the
south formed the border with Ngoni territory) and Kilwa.
Raids by the Ngoni or Magwangwara (ethnically less clearly deﬁned bands
employing Ngoni techniques) were regular occurrences in this area from the
1850s.6 These raids form the starting point for many oral accounts of local
history.7 Ngoni migrants formed the northernmost expansion of the wave
of migration that had begun in South Africa in the 1820s. They reached the
northern shores of Lake Nyasa in the 1850s and settled in the area henceforth
known as Ungoni. Their military organization and techniques made them
fearsome opponents. Today, informants explain their weakness against the
Ngoni with reference to armament. The defenders’ arrows were useless
against theNgoni’s cowhide shields and nomatch for their clubs and stabbing
spears. Raidswere seasonal rather than year-round and normally aﬀected only
part of the frontier area in any given year. There was some safety in ﬂight and
in the defendants’ better knowledge of their environment. Nevertheless the
attacks were extremely destructive, unsettling and terrifying. As late as the
1890s, German observers described razed villages and depopulated areas all
along theNgoni frontier from theRovumaRiver to theKilwa hinterland.The
population of Liwale was especially thin and unsettled.8 Further south, the
second half of the nineteenth century also witnessed a gradual and not
always peaceful in-migration ofMakua and Yao people from Portuguese East
Africa. They encountered the Makonde on the eponymous plateau, the
Mwera in the hinterland of Lindi town and a number of other groups –
Marava, Matambwe and Nindi – living in pockets throughout the region.
5 A more complete description of conditions in this area at the time can be found in
Felicitas Becker, ‘A social history of Southeast Tanzania, ca 1890–1950’ (Ph.D. thesis,
Cambridge University, 2002), ch. 1.
6 A short account of the major Ngoni raids, as far as they became known to Europeans
at the time, can be found in Edward Alpers, Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa:
Changing Patterns of Trade to the Later Nineteenth Century (London, 1975), 249–58.
Alpers is also the main printed source on the slave trade on the southern coast.
7 E.g. interviews with Selemani Omari Nachunga, Mnero-Miembeni, 9 Oct. 2000;
with Pauli Sylvester Mbunda, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000; withMohamed Kawambe,
Mnacho-Nandagala, 3 Sept. 2000. All interviews cited were conducted by the author in
July to Dec. 2000. The tapes and transcripts are in the author’s possession.
8 Oﬃcer of the Schutztruppe (the German colonial army) Zelewski toReichskolonialamt
(German Colonial Oﬃce), Berlin, 29 June 1891, Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Berlin (B’arch)
R 1001/279, 16; Bezirksamt (District Oﬃce), Kilwa (Oﬃcer Leue?) to Colonial Oﬃce,
Berlin, 5 June 1892, B’arch R 1001/214, 4; Gouvernement (German colonial government)
Dar es Salaam to Colonial Oﬃce, Berlin, 22 Sept. 1894. B’arch R 1001/284, 141; Georg
Lieder, ‘Reise von der Mbampa-Bai am Nyassa-See nach Kisswere am Indischen
Ozean’, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten (Communications from the
German Protectorates), 10 (1897), 95–142, and idem, ‘Zur Kenntnis der Karawanenwege
im Sueden des deutsch-ostafrikanischen Schutzgebietes ’, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen
Schutzgebieten, 7 (1894), 277–82.
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This mixture of shifting, at times uprooted, peoples was one reason for the
perception of this region as lacking political control. Another was the nature
of political authority. The notion of ‘statelessness’ can be misleading if
used to evoke the image of independent peasants disdainful of all authority
beyond their own homestead. Instead, in 1890, the Germans encountered a
network of power brokers of varying size throughout this region. They
were, however, more often spoken of as ‘sultans’ than as chiefs. A lack of
common ethnic aﬃliation between rulers and followers and of local ancestry
was characteristic of these rulers. For instance, one of the most formidable
and persistent opponents of the original imposition of German rule was the
‘sultan’ Machemba in the hinterland of Mikindani, a Yao who had arrived in
this area in the 1870s and controlled mostly Makonde dependants.9 Along
the main trade route from Lindi into the interior and south to the Rovuma
River, the power brokers included Hatia, a Makua governingMakua, Mwera
and Makonde subjects; Nakaam, a man of Makua immigrant ancestry who
preferred to be spoken of as a Yao immigrant, and Matola, a Yao with a
mixed, predominantly Yao and Makua following who had grown powerful
by manipulating an alliance with the Universities Mission to Central Africa
(UMCA) station at Masasi.10 These were only the most accessible, hence
best-known to German sources, of these rulers. Others were not immigrants,
but nevertheless not dynastic rulers, either. An example was Selemani
Mamba, who survives in the German record only as the leader of the attacks
on Benedictine mission stations during the Maji Maji rebellion. Informants
describe him as mpiganaji hodari,11 an accomplished ﬁghter, and kiongozi
mkubwa,12 a great leader, who had organized resistance to Ngoni invasions
among the Mwera in the northwestern hinterland of Lindi before the onset
of colonialism. Although his following was ethnically more homogeneous
than that of the ‘sultans’ along the trade routes, none of the informants
found it necessary to give him a distinguished ancestry. His position was
founded on personality, on akili za kuzaliwa, that is, in-born intelligence.
The personal quality he needed to survive as a leader is expressed in
the observation that he was mtu mwenye madawa makali,13 a man in
possession of strong medicine, which was not inheritable. The belief
in medicine, however, is the only identiﬁable institution on which Mamba
relied.
9 The most important published sources on Machemba are the reminiscences of the
ﬁrst resident representative of the German East African Company in Lindi: Rochus
Schmidt, Aus kolonialer Fruehzeit (Berlin, 1922); also the accounts of Chauncy Maples,
missionary at the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) station at Masasi, in
‘Masasi and the Rovuma district in East Africa’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographic
Society, 2 (1880), 338–53; and of the Schutztruppe oﬃcer Ernst Nigmann, Geschichte der
kaiserlichen Schutztruppe fuer Deutsch-Ostafrika (Berlin, 1911). On all these rulers see
Becker, ‘A social history’, ch. 2.
10 On Matola and his dynasty see Terence Ranger, ‘European attitudes and African
realities: the rise and fall of the Matola chiefs of Southeast Tanzania’, Journal of African
History, 20 (1979), 63–82.
11 Interview with Sigismund Makota Mpandamila, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000.
12 Interview with Xaveri Karlo Makota, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000.
13 Interview with Ibrahim Nassoro Bakari Kimbegu, Rwangwa, 18 Nov. 2000, and
with Hassan Mohamed Chilimbo, Rwangwa, 18 Nov. 2000.
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The origins of this practice of self-made leaders, whom I have termed ‘big
men’,14 are lost in the unknown past. Nevertheless, by the time the German
colonizers appeared on the scene, they were all entangled in a network of
political, commercial and military relations that connected the raiding fron-
tier in the west with the trading ports on the coast, focused on but not limited
to the long-distance trade routes. Their ways of engagement with this net-
work diﬀered. For instance, Machemba sheltered escaped slaves from the
plantations of Lindi patricians, while also raiding villages for slaves and
selling them through the port at Sudi. He was said to control the smuggling
of powder from Portuguese East Africa, kept the Magwangwara raiders oﬀ
the Makonde plateau and repeatedly duped the colonial oﬃcials at Lindi and
Mikindani in negotiations. The nearby Hatia, meanwhile, charged tribute
from caravans heading for Lindi. Selemani Mamba controlled the distri-
bution of guns in his part of Mwera country and traded with the coast
(probably in slaves) as well as organizing the defence against raiders. All of
them occasionally dressed in the style of coastal patricians, in black silk
robes, turban and umbrella.15 The big men survived on a range of often
contradictory stratagems that included slave trading and harbouring
escaped slaves, raiding and diplomacy, extortion and intimidation, as well
as patronage and the ceremonial display of power and wealth. Still, they all
participated to varying degrees in both warfare and trade.
The arms, slaves, forest produce and luxury goods they traded in moved
within two distinct if overlapping trading networks. One connected Kilwa
with Songea and the Ngoni frontier, the other connected the powerful Yao
‘sultanates’ of Portuguese East Africa, especially that of Mataka, to Lindi
and Mikindani. Kilwa was at this time the biggest supplier of the Zanzibar
slave market, while all the ports on this stretch of coast supplied slaves, ivory,
grains and forest produce such as gum copal to external markets. Ngoni
also traded with Lindi and Yao with Kilwa, but methods of control and
the relative inﬂuence of the players diﬀered between the two networks. The
diﬀerence between the two, and the ways they changed under increasing
German inﬂuence, again serve to elucidate why political relations in this area
were volatile.
THE ONSET OF GERMAN CONTROL
A chronology of German encroachment on the networks of Southeast
Tanzania’s power brokers has to begin with theGerman colonial rulers estab-
lishing themselves in the coastal towns in 1890. On the southern coast this
takeover was less violent and destructive than in Bagamoyo, Pangani and
Saadani, where the so-called ‘Arab uprising’ took place.16 Slave exports from
14 The term ‘big men’, originally from Oceanian ethnography, was made useful for
African history by Jan Vansina, in Paths in the Rainforest: Towards a History of Political
Tradition in Equatorial Africa (London, 1990). See also Becker, ‘A social history’, chs. 1
and 2 and introduction.
15 OnMataka’s performance, Bezirksamtmann (District Oﬃcer) Zache, Lindi, ‘Report
on journey to the Rovuma’, 23 Jan. 1900, B’arch R 1001/220, 14; on a similar display
by Hatia, another Schutztruppe oﬃcer: J. Stenzler, Deutsch-Ostafrika: Kriegs- und
Friedensbilder (Berlin, 1910), 54.
16 See Glassman, Feasts and Riot, for a compelling account of the events on the
northern coast.
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Kilwa to Zanzibar were even said to have increased during the uprising,
while the boats patrolling the coast concentrated on the northern ports.17
Kilwa’s oligarchy got oﬀ lightly in the investigation following the uprising,
in spite of the deaths of two German East African Company (Deutsch-
Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, DOAG) representatives in the town at the
hands of rebels. Two men were convicted of the killings and hanged, a small
number in the light of the government’s readiness to use draconian sen-
tences.18 In Lindi and Mikindani, the DOAG representative adopted a
conciliatory manner, eager to coax back the Yao trade.19 Coastal notables,
well aware of the much harsher fate of the northern towns, tried to oblige the
new rulers.20 In 1894, however, the routing ofHassan binOmarMakunganya,
executed in 1895 after at least 18 months of hit-and-run warfare against
the Germans and their supporters in the area south of Kilwa, intensiﬁed
German control of the coastal oligarchy.21 When numerous letters from
Kilwa were found in his possession at his capture22 the German government
decided that the contacts between Hassan and the Kilwa patriciate were
treasonous and imposed executions, exile and heavy ﬁnes on the town’s
elite.23 This was by far the most heavy-handed demonstration of supremacy
over the elites of Kilwa on the part of the colonial government since its
arrival.
Meanwhile, in the ﬁrst half of the 1890s, the Ngoni showed little tendency
to curtail their raiding despite the German presence. In June 1891,
Magwangwara raids into the area between the Matumbi Hills and the Ruﬁji
rapids went ahead as usual.24 Even in 1894, after a German expedition to the
area north of Ungoni, the Ngoni proceeded to raid heavily along the Rovuma
River and in the Lindi and Mikindani hinterland.25 In 1896, Ngoni raiding
parties tore down a German ﬂag and threatened to punish several minor
chiefs near the Rovuma, most prominently Undi, ally of the Yao big man
Mataka in Mozambique, for accepting German protection.26 In 1897,
17 Fritz Weidner, Die Haussklaverei in Ostafrika (Jena, 1915), 81–2. Weidner was a
lawyer preparing to join the German colonial service.
18 For diﬀerences of status and descent in coastal towns more generally, see Glassman,
Feasts and Riot, esp. ch. 5; and District Oﬃcer Bagamoyo to Colonial Government, Dar
es Salaam, 21 Aug. 1908, Tanzanian National Archives (TNA) G9/46, vol. 1 part 2,
48 et seq. 19 Schmidt, Aus Kolonialer Fruehzeit, 145 et seq.
20 On the cooperative attitudes of the coastal oligarchies, see the reports of District
Agricultural Oﬃcer Jochen Schroeder fromKilwa in TNAG8/19; and of District Oﬃcer
Ewerbeck, Lindi, in ‘Report on slavery in Lindi district ’, 14 Sept. 1897, B’arch 1001/
1004, 105.
21 For an account of the conﬂict, see former Governor Wissmann, Dar es Salaam, to
German Chancellor Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, Berlin, 1 Oct. 1895, B’arch R 1001/286,
86; on his earlier activities, Stenzler, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 54 et seq.
22 Hans Zache, ‘Shairi la Makunganya: Das Makunganya-Lied’, Mitteilungen des
Seminars fuer Orientalische Sprachen, 1, no. 3 (1898), 86–114, is the source for the details
on the investigation in Kilwa after Hassan’s capture.
23 Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, to Colonial Oﬃce, Berlin, 16 Dec. 1895,
B’arch R 1001/287, 9.
24 Oﬃcer Zelewski to Colonial Oﬃce, Berlin, 29 June 1891, B’arch R 1001/279, 16.
25 Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam to Colonial Oﬃce, Berlin, 22 Sept. 1894.
B’arch R 1001/284, 141.
26 District Oﬃcer Engelhardt, Kilwa, to Colonial Oﬃce, Berlin, ‘Report on the ex-
pedition to Songea’, 2 Aug. 1897, B’arch R 1001/288, 202.
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however, another German expedition, this time to Ungoni itself, forcefully
demonstrated German military power. With the establishment of Songea
military station,27 freewheeling Ngoni military power was broken. Con-
sidering the signiﬁcance of the Ngoni threat to the societies of the southeast
for decades before, German conquest marked a sea change. But the people in
the region could not be sure of its extent or its duration. The German
missionary Adams found the western Ngindo still in terror of their Ngoni
neighbours in 1898.28 Still, some people were quick to test the new waters.
Over the following years, the traders, rubber collectors and Ngindo peasants
who had been the most vulnerable to the Ngoni threat began to travel or even
settle on the former Ngoni frontier in a way hitherto unimaginable.
With the Kilwa oligarchy humiliated and the Ngoni subdued, German
control of the hinterland began to be a reality. During the eight-year period
from the subjection of the Ngoni in 1897 to the outbreak of the Maji Maji
uprising in 1905 a vast array of people, from military strongmen to petty
traders, struggled to carve out, seize or rebuild opportunities. German
oﬃcials thought in simple terms of ‘us’ (legitimate rulers) against ‘them’
(illegitimate troublemakers), but they were demolishing a network of power
brokers based on shifting loyalties and internal competition. Two develop-
ments especially fed the rising tensions: extended participation in upcountry
trade with increased security and the legal consolidation of slavery combined
with half-hearted attempts to suppress the slave trade.
TRADE AFTER 18 9 7: INCREASING PARTICIPATION
Long-distance trade along the routes in Southeast Tanzania diﬀered from
that along the central route. Unlike the Bagamoyo route, dominated by the
Nyamwezi, there were few professional porters in the Kilwa trade. Slaves
from Kilwa as well as free Ngoni from Songea worked as porters.29 But ac-
cording to the District Oﬃce, the majority of porters in Kilwa belonged
nowhere:
As there is no porter stock around here comparable to the Nyamwezi in the north
of the colony, the traders depend for transportation of their loads on people hired
from among the population of the coast … for the most part they are individuals
without any other occupation, who prefer the lazy life of the caravan to any other
activity. Obviously, they are the worst elements of the populace.30
In Lindi, the situation was somewhat diﬀerent. In 1899, the District Oﬃce
wrote about porters in Lindi and their wage negotiations with coastal
traders: ‘These people, who all come from the interior, pursue porterage as a
profession and are well versed in the choice and value of textiles … often
27 Ibid.
28 Alfons Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes (St Ottilien, 1899), 132. Alfons Adams was a
German Catholic missionary.
29 J. F. Elton, ‘On the coast country of East Africa south of Zanzibar’, Journal of the
Royal Geographic Society, 44 (1874), 227–52 at 249; District Oﬃce, Kilwa, to Colonial
Government, Dar es Salaam, 19 Nov. 1899, TNA G1/35, 169; District Oﬃce, Lindi to
Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1899, TNA G 1/35, 138.
30 District Oﬃce, Kilwa, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 19 Nov. 1899, TNA
G 1/35, 169.
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negotiations lasting several days are necessary to achieve an understand-
ing’.31 Throughout the 1890s, the largest caravans reaching Lindi were those
under the patronage of Mataka, which included hundreds of people all from
the interior. The diﬀerence between the rootless Kilwa porters who struck
the District Oﬃcer as such rabble and the more purposeful Lindi porters
relates to the degrees of insecurity and violence along these routes.32 In the
hinterland of Lindi, Machemba kept Ngoni raids at bay, and the big men
along the route to Lindi, Hatia andMatola especially followed less predatory
methods of exploitation than the Ngoni. Moreover, Mataka made good use
of his allies on the Rovuma and of the German administration’s eagerness
to curry favour with him and make sure he sent his caravans to their ports
rather than to northern Mozambique.33
Along the routes to Kilwa, meanwhile, there were no big men of compar-
able importance, and local people were extremely vulnerable to raids as well
as to abuses by caravans. The people of Liwale were worst placed to proﬁt
from trade, even though it passed through their territory for much of the
way between Songea and Kilwa. Yet caravans could not but depend on
the areas they were passing through for shelter, water and often for food.
Thus, even the Ngindo had a modicum of bargaining power. Conditions
changed year after year, in tune with raiding and harvests, on which the
food trade with caravans depended.34 There is some indication, too, that rela-
tions with the Ngoni included more than those of hunter and prey. Located
closer to the coast than the Ngoni, there was some scope for Ngindo to act
as intermediate traders and suppliers to passing raiding parties.35 Still,
by removing the need for military strength among caravans in 1897, the
colonizers threw open the door to the hinterland to new traders. As they
noted: ‘Suﬃcient ﬁnancial means and increased conﬁdence have helped the
relatively risky caravan trade, geared mostly towards obtaining rubber, grow
to signiﬁcant proportions. Almost three-quarters of local imports are carried
up country’. And
The character of Lindi’s trade has changed. Even two years ago the Manyan
[Indian traders] and others remained at the coast or only ventured into nearby
places. Now 4–5 Manyans are touring the interior, go even as far as the middle
Rovuma, one has opened his shop at the Ilulu mountain, a sign of the peaceful state
of the south.36
The most important produce driving the expansion of trade was rubber.
The importance of the ‘rubber frontier’ has been noted before, with emphasis
on the Mahenge area.37 Closer to the coast, British observers had noticed
31 District Oﬃce, Lindi, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 20 Dec. 1899, TNA
G 1/35, 179.
32 Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, ch. 7, esp. 219–29; Elton, ‘On the coast country’, 230.
33 See the ﬁles of the District Oﬃce Lindi for 1900–3 for the attempts of the District
Oﬃce to persuade Mataka to move to German East Africa by oﬀering him Tunduru
under the name of ‘Neubrandenburg’, B’arch R 1001/220, 14–125.
34 Lieder, ‘Zur Kenntnis der Karawanenwege’, 277–82.
35 A. R. W. Crosse-Upcott, ‘The social structure of the Kingindo-speaking people’
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1956), ch. 2.
36 Jahresbericht ueber die Entwicklung des Ostafrikanischen Schutzgebietes fuer 1897,
Deutsches Kolonialblatt (1898, Beilage), 88. 37 Wright, ‘Maji Maji ’, 124–43.
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rubber collection in the 1870s in northern Kilwa and Mikindani districts. In
1891, District Oﬃcer von Behr in Mikindani observed rubber collection on
the Makonde plateau.38 In the same year, the Lindi District Oﬃce reported
that about 50,000 pounds of rubber had been brought into Lindi during the
June to August season, with 350–400 people coming into town each month
to sell rubber.39 Liwale, meanwhile, was experiencing something akin to a
boom. In 1898, the German missionary, Adams, found people in western
Liwale living scattered in poor huts and still terriﬁed of the Ngoni, but well
dressed thanks to the rubber trade.40 Its growth can be gauged partly in
conjunction with the growth of trade overall. The caravan trade from Kilwa
grew from 6,615 loads in 1899 to 11,334 in 1903. During this period, rubber
made up about half of the exports from Kilwa.41 Rubber exports from Kilwa
grew in value from 443,980 German Marks in 1902/3 to 664,532 German
Marks in 1903/4.42 In Mikindani, rubber was the most important export
product in 1907.43
Rubber was diﬀerent from other high-value trade goods. It could be
collected by anyone with a knife in a forest, a stark contrast with hunting
elephants or slaves. Concomitantly, the traders who bought rubber in the
interior often were small, independent entrepreneurs.44 Also, rubber vine, a
perennial plant, was not subject to the vagaries of the rain to the same extent
as other agricultural produce. With demand booming, rubber was a reliable
and accessible source of income. In an area where political control had long
been bound up with control of trade, it was an unusually democratic trade
good. Contemporary German observers noted the social repercussions of
the trade, such as increased participation in the monetarized economy and
in money-lending.45 Liwale’s good record as a tax-paying province was
attributed to its wealth in rubber.46 The fact that this hitherto impoverished
and vulnerable area experienced an inﬂux of cash due to rubber underscores
the point that this trade good was partly independent of the established
circuits of goods which the big men exploited. There is no direct evidence
of their views on the rubber trade, but they are likely to have observed it
closely and with mixed feelings.
38 Leutnant von Behr, ‘Geographische and Ethnographische Notizen aus dem Fluss-
gebiet des Rovuma’,Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, 5 (1892), 15–20.
39 ‘Bezirk und Station Lindi’, Deutsches Kolonialblatt (1891), 262.
40 Alfons Adams, ‘Vom Nyassa-See nach Upogoro und Donde’, Mitteilungen aus den
deutschen Schutzgebieten, 11 (1898), 251–4.
41 Paul Fuchs, ‘Die wirtschaftliche Erkundung einer Ostafrikanischen Suedbahn’,
Beihefte zum Tropenpﬂanzer, 6, nos. 4–5 (1905), 273. 42 Ibid. 277.
43 Eugen Werth, Das Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Kuestenland und die vorgelagerten Inseln
(Berlin, 1915), 94.
44 ‘Schadensprotokolle ’ (damage reports) of traders who suﬀered losses in Maji Maji,
TNAG3/73, passim. Typically they were caught out by the uprising at the house of a local
contact.
45 Walter Busse, ‘Forschungsreise durch den suedlichen Teil von Deutsch-Ostafrika’,
Beihefte zum Tropenpﬂanzer, 3 (1902), 93–119, esp. 100; Leutnant von Behr, ‘Die
Voelker zwischen Ruﬁji and Rovuma’, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten,
6 (1893), 69–87, esp. 78; Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 22 (1905), TNA G1/136. On
the limits of the use of money and hopes to extend it, see District Oﬃce, Mikindani, to
colonial government, Dar es Salaam, ‘Report on the caravan trade’, 1 Apr. 1899, TNAG
1/35, 145. 46 Adams, ‘Vom Nyassa-See nach Upogoro und Donde’.
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Rubber vines were not ubiquitous; they were scarce inMasasi and western
Mwera country.47 But other forest and agricultural produce also made
important contributions to trade, namely beeswax,48 sesame and grain, es-
pecially millet ; ivory, too, still played a role.49 In 1902/3, millet exports from
Lindi reached 4,782,064 pounds, maize 209,682 pounds.50 In one centre of
peasant grain trade, Ndumbwe near Sudi south of Lindi, the turnover during
the four-month trading period was said to reach 20,000 Rupees.51 There is
no record of centres of production further up country. Still, the trader who
set up shop in Ilulu in 1900 most likely depended on a mixture of grain,
forest produce and maybe the occasional ivory tusk to get by. Thus, across
Southeast Tanzania, the last years of the nineteenth century witnessed eﬀorts
to open up new trading opportunities, even by people with very limited
means. The dozens of traders who reported losses of goods worth less than
50 Rupees after the Maji Maji rebellion bear witness to the same develop-
ment. Comparing the routes centred on Kilwa and those centred on Lindi,
the latter experienced a good deal more continuity. Along the routes to
Kilwa, political control was more fragmented; the actual and potential
implications of curtailing Ngoni raids were greater and less predictable.
AMBIGUOUS CHANGES IN SLAVERY
The establishment of German rule oﬃcially brought slave trading to an end,
but it continued along both the Yao and the Songea routes in the 1890s, if on
a much reduced scale. There were several suppliers. Irked by the German
presence, a few Kilwa slave traders intensiﬁed their cooperation with Ngoni
raiders. On his military expedition in 1894, the German commander Schele
met a number of traders fromKilwa living in the Ngoni sphere of inﬂuence.52
He appointed the most prominent of them, Rashid bin Masoud, as akida
for this region. When Rashid and other coastal traders met the German
expedition to Ungoni in 1897, the oﬃcer in charge stated:
A signiﬁcant proportion of the human loot [of recent Ngoni raids], mostly young
women, has been sold to the many Arabs and Swahilis, mostly Kilwa natives, who
live here … The coastal people have partly sold them on, mostly to the same port.
The akida Rashid, Mohamed bin Said, and almost all the coastal people … are said
to have participated in the slave purchase.53
47 Most explicitly in interview with Muhamed Athuman Mwindi, Mnero-Kitandi,
15 Sept. 2000. Also interview with Alois Ali Gomea, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000, and
with Saidi Bakari Matupulango, Mnero-Kipara, 23 Sept. 2000.
48 The product mentioned most frequently by informants, e.g. interviews with Xaveri
Karlo Makota, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000; with Ismail Mkwenya, Mnero-Kitandi,
15 Sept. 2000.
49 Interview with Alois Ali Gomea, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000; Leutnant
Engelhard, report on expedition to Ngoni, 2 Aug. 1897, B’arch R 1001/1004, 88.
50 Fuchs, ‘Suedbahn’, 277. These ﬁgures comprise peasant and plantation production.
51 District Oﬃcer Berg, ‘Das Bezirksamt Mikindani ’, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen
Schutzgebieten, 10 (1897), 206–13.
52 Gouverneur Schele, Dar es Salaam, to Colonial Oﬃce, Berlin, 27 Mar. 1894, B’arch
R 1001/184, 54.
53 Leutnant Engelhard, ‘Report on Expedition to Ngoni’, 2 Aug. 1897, B’arch R 1001/
1004, 88. The ‘human loot’ were captives of the raids in the preceding years, especially
1894, into the Lindi hinterland and along the Rovuma.
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Up until at least 1897, then, new slaves still arrived in the Kilwa area. In
Lindi, the District Oﬃce’s observations make clear that the administration
tolerated covert slave trading. In September 1897, District Oﬃcer Ewerbeck
estimated that since 1890 about 1,000 slaves a year had been absorbed into
agriculture on the coast between the Rovuma River and Kiswere, half way
between Lindi and Kilwa. A few hundred a year were exported by sea
and some brought to Kilwa for sale.54 A large number of these slaves were
brought to Lindi under the aegis of the Yao sultan Mataka. Abd el Kader,
the most eminent patrician in the town of Sudi and Machemba’s ally on the
coast, was also known to be a slave dealer.55
In 1897 reports from Lindi noted that ‘slave exports seem to be put on
hold at present, to the beneﬁt of agriculture, to which Arabs and Blacks turn
increasingly’.56 While studies of Zanzibar and the Mrima coast further north
also document the development of slave-based plantation agriculture,57 the
movement of Zanzibaris to the mainland coast during Seyid Barghash’s reign
aﬀected the southern coast as well. Some time in the 1870s, Nassor
bin Halfan, brother of the notorious Zanzibari slaver Rumaliza, established
himself in Mroweka, a village on an eponymous creek about 40 km southeast
of Lindi.58 There were others like him, if on a more modest scale, in nearby
locations.59 Reputedly the wealthiest man in Lindi, Ahmad bin Amar, was
said to have owned about 800 slaves at the time of his death in 1882. Two
other major owners had recently lost 80 and 120 slaves respectively in mass
escapes.60 The planters at Lindi were, in eﬀect, part of a moving frontier
from Kilwa. Since the opening up of land was a laborious operation, slaves
were used to drain the ground in Mroweka valley, to cut the forest and
possibly even to deepen the channel of the stream for ease of transport.61
They also planted labour-intensive crops, such as rice and sugarcane.
In the 1890s, the southeast regularly exported large quantities of grains and
oilseed.62 While peasants supplied some of these products, the ﬁgures related
to them are the most concrete indicator of the plantation sector’s substantial
size. Kilwa’s patriciate controlled a great deal of land near the coast. The
observations of Jochen Schroeder, a German agricultural extension oﬃcer in
54 Ewerbeck, ‘Report on slavery’, B’arch R 1001/1004, 105.
55 Former Governor Wissmann, Dar es Salaam, to Chancellor Hohenlohe-Schillings-
fuerst, Berlin, 19 Oct. 1896, B’arch R 1001/287, 87.
56 Ewerbeck, ‘Report on slavery’, B’arch R 1001/1004, 105.
57 The main reference is again Glassman, Feasts and Riot, ch. 3, esp. 96–106.
58 Interview with Mohamed bin Halfan bin Nassor bin Halfan al-Barwani, Mingoyo
17 Aug. 2000.
59 Ibid. ; interviews with Mzee Juma Sudi bin Juma, Mingoyo, 9 Aug. 2000 and with
Mohamed bin Halfan, Mingoyo, 17 Aug. 2000.
60 Ewerbeck, ‘Report on slavery’, B’arch R 1001/1004, 105.
61 Interviews with Mzee Juma Sudi bin Juma, Mingoyo, 9 Aug. 2000, with Mohamed
bin Halfan, Mingoyo, 17 Aug. 2000, and with Mzee Hamidi bin Musa bin Swalehe bin
Shehe, Mingoyo, 13 Aug. 2000.
62 Deutsches Kolonialblatt (1902), 285–90; E. Obst, ‘Der Handel in Deutsch-Ostafrika
als Ausdruck der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung’, Koloniale Rundschau (1913), 449–85;
Statistische Daten ueber Ein-und Ausfuhr des Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Schutzge-
bietes, Deutsches Kolonialblatt (1893), 340–7, (1894), 538–45, (1895), 608–15, (1896),
354–65, (1897), 364–73, (1898), 336–45, (1899), 196–399, (1900), 316–19; Fuchs,
‘Suedbahn’, 277.
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Kilwa, provide some information on them. In 1892–3, he found plots near
town, which belonged partly to the sultan of Zanzibar and partly to small
local landowners, badly kept.63 However, Schroeder was full of praise for the
‘halfcaste Arab’ Uledin Mputa, a large landowner north of Kilwa. It took
Schroeder an hour to walk through Mputa’s plantations, which supported c.
10,000 coconut palms. He also praised the ‘discipline’ of Uledin’s ‘workers’,
which suggests that Mputa’s slaves were driven by a fairly harsh regime.
Evidently, stratiﬁcation among landowners was marked and not all were
very productive. It appears that the larger owners were better placed to
extract labour from their slaves.64 Overall, the plantation sector was active
and growing, despite the oﬃcial outlawing of the slave trade.
Moreover, there were enterprising individuals who sought to expand slave
plantation agriculture much further into the hinterland.65 For instance,
German records from the 1890s repeatedly mention Saidi Makanjira in the
area of the Mbemkuru River, variously described as a cousin of a Kilwa
trader, a friend of Yao ‘sultan’ Mataka and a pioneer of intensive agriculture
in the hinterland.66 German sources also mention him as a landowner at
the mouth of the same river,67 a location that harboured many slaves. In the
northwestern hinterland of Lindi, the present inhabitants identify the town
of Ruponda as his onetime home base, still marked out by his mango trees.68
While Makanjira’s grandson preferred to think of his slaves as people who
had been arrested for trying to steal cassava,69 a less partisan informant re-
vealed that some parents sold children to him, ‘so they might work for him’.70
A man of many connections, Makanjira apparently survived in an unstable
situation by forging alliances with the powers of the day: Mataka as well as
the Ngoni and later the Germans. Further up country, Arabs around Rashid
bin Masoud were experimenting with slave agriculture, including labour-
intensive sugarcane.71Meanwhile,German legislation enforced and enshrined
the legal status of master and slave in a new way. By recognizing slavery as
a legal status, the administration threw open the door to self-serving inter-
pretations of the law by others. In 1897 District Oﬃcer Ewerbeck reported
63 Reports by Jochen Schroeder, Kilwa, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, TNA
G8/19, passim, esp. Schroeder to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 21 Sept. 1893,
TNA G 8/19, 47–55.
64 The large number of relatively independent, tithe-paying slaves near Kilwa was
noted by Weidner, Haussklaverei, 21–2.
65 Interviews with Sigismund Makota Mpandamila, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000,
with Omari Bakari Kulungu, Mnero-Mwandila, 16 Sept. 2000, with Issa Nnegerea,
Marambo, 8 Oct. 2000; District Oﬃcer Ewerbeck, Lindi, ‘Report on a journey through
the district ’, 14 Apr. 1897, B’arch R 1001/288, 104.
66 Schutztruppe oﬃcer Fromm to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 18 Aug. 1896,
B’arch, R 1001/1040, 2; Lieder, ‘Zur Kenntnis der Karawanenwege’, 277–82; District
Oﬃcer Zache, Mikindani, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 23 Jan. 1900. B’arch
R 1001/220, 45.
67 Lieder, ‘Zur Kenntnis der Karawanenwege’, 277–82; Ewerbeck, ‘Report on
slavery’, B’arch R 1001/1004, 105.
68 Interviews with Monica Hassani, Mnero-Ngongo, 15 Sept. 2000, with Meinulf
Joseph, Ruponda, 25 Sept. 2000, with Rashid Salum Matumburo, Ngunichile, 20 Sept.
2000. 69 Interview with Rashid Salim Ali Matumburo, Ngunichile, 20 Sept. 2000.
70 Interview with Hassan Ahmed Chindenya, Ruponda, 7 Oct. 2000.
71 Lieder, ‘Reise von der Mbampa-Bai’.
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from Lindi that :
It happens often that people claim their own relatives as slaves … on the upper
Mbemkuru and on the northern border of the district, there were recently seven
cases against one jumbe, who had attributed reputed freemen to someone else as
slaves. Jumbe Ali bin Salim … has declared about two hundred people slaves
within the last three years, who for many years … had not been in a servile
position. In one case there were almost thirty members of one family, mostly
women and children.72
Terence Ranger has pointed out that agricultural workers on Matola’s
plots during the Maji Maji uprising were, in eﬀect, slaves.73 Matola’s rival,
Nakaam, owned 122 slaves in 1914, according to the District Oﬃce.74 How
many of Hatia’s ‘followers’ were slaves is impossible to say. In the Lindi
hinterland, slavery was thought of as an outcome of clan relations and obli-
gations: slaves were ‘paid’ for bad debts, for killings or in exchange for food.
But slaves were also ‘stupid’ or ‘weak’ people who gave up their autonomy
in return for protection or fell under the spell of medicine-wielding strong-
men.75 Thus slavery formed part of the big men’s forms of control over
people, and German policy, while it sometimes interfered with the practice
of slavery, did little to challenge it in principle.
The expansion of rubber production and trade also made the means
to purchase slaves more widely available. Before the German conquest, the
Anglican missionary Chauncy Maples at Masasi, on the route from Lindi to
Lake Nyassa, had connected an increase in slave holding by Makonde vil-
lagers with the rubber trade, as they invested revenue from rubber sales in
slaves. A similar observation in 1905 referred to Liwale: ‘The inadequacy of
the administrative staﬀ is proven by the fact that recently … over ﬁfty slave
children were picked up here, who had been sold to local natives mostly in
the course of the last year, almost under the eyes of the administration, by
Yao coming from the lake [Nyasa]! ’.76 That the Liwale region, recently a
hunting ground for slavers, should have imported slaves in 1905 was quite
a reversal of fortunes, indicating the changes that followed the imposition of
German rule.
THE COURSE OF THE REBELLION IN THE SOUTHEAST
The Maji Maji uprising began when Matumbi rebels sacked the cotton
plantations near Kibata, northwest of Kilwa, on 28 July 1905.77 On 15
August Ngindo rebels burned down the ‘Boma’ in Liwale town and killed
its garrison, including a German non-commissioned oﬃcer and a German
72 Ewerbeck, ‘Report on slavery’, B’archR1001/1004, 105;Weidner,Haussklaverei, 88.
73 Ranger, ‘European attitudes and African realities ’, 72.
74 ‘A letter came from Herr Wendt, says he has been able to arrange for the redemption
of Mzee Nakaam’s Slaves for R 4325. He sent a list of 122 slaves’. Masasi Parish Diary,
Apr. 1914, Library of the University of Dar es Salaam.
75 Interview with Hassan Mohamed Chilimbo, Rwangwa, 18 Nov. 2000.
76 Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 22 (1905), TNA G 1/136.
77 Where no other source is given, the account follows that given by John Iliﬀe. See
John Iliﬀe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), 168–98.
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planter who had sought refuge there. On 26 August, a German detachment
on the way from Songea to Liwale was wiped out along with its German
oﬃcer.78 South of Kilwa, the members of an expedition intended to repair
the telegraph line to Lindi were killed in the early days of September.79 In
Lindi district, Mwera rebels destroyed the Benedictine mission station at
Lukuledi on 28 August along with Mkomaindo, the UMCA mission station
at Masasi.80 The next day, rebels from the same area under the command
of Selemani Mamba pillaged the Benedictines’ station at Nyangao. The
attackers then moved on to Mroweka, the trading settlement on the edge of
Lindi creek, where they killed four Arab inhabitants. In the western reaches
of Lindi district, however, the advance of the rebels was checked after the
sacking of Lukuledi mission by the akida of Masasi, a former member of
the German colonial army, and his troops. In the following weeks, Matola
of Masasi and Nakaam counter-attacked, seizing crops and people with
German encouragement.81 The Mwera fought back, led by Nachinuku, a big
man from Mnacho in southern Mwera country.82 The only people south of
the Lukuledi River to join the uprising were a handful of Makonde majumbe,
local German-appointed administrators, and remnants of Machemba’s
followers on the northern edge of the Makonde plateau, who were quickly
kept in check by the stationing of a detachment of askaris.
The early successes of the rebels were followed by piecemeal guerrilla
warfare, as the Schutztruppe took the initiative to retaliate and ‘pacify’ the
area. Still, the rebels continued to stage major attacks on German troops.
The biggest battle in Mwera country occurred as late as 1 December at a
place known as Nghullu or Muhuru in the Ilulu region; the German gover-
nor at the time, Graf Goetzen, cites an estimate of 2,000 rebels involved.83
Although the rebels left 81 behind, this battle was followed by two major
skirmishes at Mbemba on the Mbemkuru River and south of it in Mnero
valley.84 In the Kilwa hinterland, a band of about 1,000 rebels was stopped
outside Kilwa on 26 September85 and in November, a fortiﬁed station at
Liwale, serving the supply line for an expedition to Ungoni, was attacked
for ﬁve consecutive days.86 Along with these battles, constant hit-and-run
attacks took place against troops on the march in Kibata, Matumbi, Liwale
and the Lindi hinterland. Nevertheless, after numerous expeditions Lindi
district and Matumbi were declared largely quiet by the end of 1905. A
campaign to stamp out unrest in Liwale was only started in late April 1906,
but before that date the region had already been subjected to the abuses
of passing troops for months.87 After three weeks of ‘energetic activity’ by
a Schutztruppe detachment, the area was declared calm in May 1906. Still, a
second campaign in June 1906, chasing after retreating Ngindo rebel leaders,
again met serious resistance.88 With its conclusion, however, ﬁghting in this
78 Nigmann, Geschichte der Schutztruppe, 97.
79 Graf A. von Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand 1905–7 (Berlin, 1909), 92.
80 Ibid. 90–1. 81 MMRP 7/68/1/1 and 7/68/2/1; Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika.
82 Interview with Ismael Chikwakwa Mtapule, Mnacho-Nandagala 2 Sept. 2000;
MMRP 7/68/2/1. 83 Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 164; MMRP 7/68/1/1 and 2/1.
84 MMRP 7/68/1/1/ and 2/1; interview with Alois Ali Gomea, Mnero, 13 Sept. 2000.
85 Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 93. 86 Nigmann, Geschichte der Schutztruppe, 115.
87 Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 225. 88 Ibid. 229.
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region ceased. The after-eﬀects of the brutal suppression continued to be felt
for years.
THE CENTRES OF UNREST IN RELATION TO
THE BIG MEN’S NETWORKS
The geographic spread of the rebellion coincides roughly with the division
between the trading network connected to Kilwa and that linked to Lindi
and Mikindani. All the regions crossed by trade routes to Kilwa joined
in, whereas the main route to Lindi, along the Lukuledi valley, formed the
southern limit of the extension of the rebellion. Of the big men who joined
the uprising, those on the border between the two areas were the least
enthusiastic.89 Matola in Masasi, Mataka’s allies on the Rovuma and
Nakaam, Hatia’s neighbour to the south, did not take part. All these big men
had reasons for staying out of trouble. For Mataka, good relations with
the German colonial government were essential while his position with the
authorities of Portuguese East Africa was becoming diﬃcult.90 Matola had
for many years proﬁted from his alliance with the UMCA missionaries.91
Generally traders and big men with connections south of the Rovuma had
less to fear from German encroachment than those whose interests lay in the
network connecting Kilwa and Songea, as they had the option of shifting
their trade south of the border.
But the regional boundaries of the uprising also suggest continuity with
the earlier tensions in the Kilwa-centred trade network. On the face of it,
strife had been diminishing. Liwale, enjoying unwonted security fromNgoni
raiding and an inﬂux of cash thanks to the rubber boom, made an unlikely
epicentre of rebellion. In Lindi district, too, the heaviest ﬁghting took place
in the northwest near Mount Ilulu, a sub-district that had proﬁted from the
subjection of the Ngoni and was remote from the intrusions of the colonial
administration in Lindi.92 When the Lindi District Oﬃcer crossed the
Mwera plateau in the last days of July 1905, he had found the villagers wel-
coming and had taken the opportunity to reassure them that forced cotton
cultivation would end.93
Both the ﬁrst and the second wave of research into the Maji Maji rebellion
highlighted the hardships arising from colonial occupation as a reason for
the rebellion. Yet if anything distinguished the regions that began and
sustained the rebellion, it was not a particular depth of despair at colonial
oppression.94 This is not to deny that colonial rule was oppressive. The
themes of resentment against tax collection and forced labour recur in both
written and oral sources on the background to the rebellion; oral sources
also document German brutality. But while these grievances were real, they
89 MMRP 7/68/2/1 and 1/1, interview with Mwalimu Bonifasi Mchekenje Mpanda,
Ndanda-Njenga, 6 Sept. 2000.
90 Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, 243–53; District Oﬃce, Mikindani (Zache), to Colonial
Government, Dar es Salaam, n.d. (1900/1), B’arch R 1001/220, 94–6.
91 Ranger, ‘European attitudes and African realities ’, 63–82.
92 District Oﬃce, Mikindani (Zache), to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, ‘Report
on a journey through the district ’, 23 Jan. 1900, B’arch R 1001/220, 55.
93 District Oﬃce, Lindi, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam,15 Sept. 1905, B’arch
R 1001/723, 59.
94 John Iliﬀe stated this fact in his account of the rebellion in idem,Modern History.
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were not limited to this part of the colony; hence they cannot explain
why the rebellion occurred here. On the other hand, some improvements
had occurred in Liwale and other rubber-exporting locations during the
earliest years of German rule. This observation, paradoxical if the rebellion
was a response to colonial oppression, may help to explain its direction and
strength. From this perspective, the rebels’ aims were not only defensive.
Rather, ﬁghters tried to seize a promising moment so as to secure or extend
the beneﬁts they had reaped or hoped to reap from the ongoing changes in
commercial, political and military relations. Their attacks focused not only
on the German presence, but also took on local actors who threatened to take
advantage of them in the ongoing struggle for opportunity.
In their ﬁrst attacks, the rebels targeted so-called communal cotton
ﬁelds in Kibata, north of the Matumbi Hills. The reaction against forced
labour on ‘communal shambas’ is among the best-established causes of the
rebellion.95 The main organizers and beneﬁciaries of these mashamba
were the maakida, literate district administrators whom the colonial govern-
ment had appointed. But the importance of these men preceded German
rule and colonial administrators tended to choose maakida from among
coastal men considered inﬂuential and well versed in the aﬀairs of the hinter-
land. The akida in the Mbemkuru River region was a coastal man who had at
ﬁrst been put in charge of a number of villages on the Makonde plateau
after Machemba’s expulsion. After a shootout with locals that left one of
his entourage dead, he was transferred to Ilulu to help conquer the area. In
Songea, one of the main slave dealers, Rashid bin Masoud, was made an
akida. While not all the akidas had such a mercenary background, they
were part of the push of coastal colonizers up country.
Moreover, Kibata, the ﬁrst target of the rebels, was situated in a heavily
commercialized area. It lay on the way from Mahenge and Liwale rubber
areas to the coast, one of a network of small trading settlements that also
participated in the grain trade from the Ruﬁji River. It also lay on the border
with the Matumbi Hills, the independent stronghold supplying forest pro-
duce and occasional labourers to UledinMputa’s ﬁelds. During the uprising,
Matumbi coming down from their hills devastated coastal coconut plan-
tations as well as the ‘communal shambas’. UledinMputa did not survive the
uprising; his ﬁelds were pillaged.96 All down the coast, the western reaches
of the plantation belt were foci of unrest. Along the Mavuji River, former
hideout of the Kilwan rebel Hassan bin Omar, troops were needed to defend
loyal majumbe and maakida against the rebellious ones.97 The restive and
independent villages where Hassan had found his support were evidently
still in place. Another focus of unrest lay on the border of Kilwa and Lindi,
near the mouth of the Mbemkuru River.98 This area was home to many
slaves and to the settlements of the ambitious planter Saidi Makanjira.
95 At the time the problem was stated in John Booth and W. Schmitz, ‘Nachtrag zur
Denkschrift ueber die Ursachen des Aufstandes in Ostafrika’, 10 Dec. 1905, B’arch
R 1001/726, 163–8.
96 List of damages to his properties by his heirs, in ‘Schadensprotokolle ’ (reports on
losses suﬀered in the Maji Maji rebellion), TNA G3/73.
97 Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 135–6.
98 District Oﬃce, Lindi to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 19 Sept. 1905, B’arch
R 1001/723, 56.
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Further south, near Lindi town, an attack on Mroweka village left four
Arab settlers dead. Mroweka was the trading settlement associated with a
focus of Arab settlement, especially the plantations of a member of a leading
Zanzibari slave-trading family, Nassor bin Halfan. Bands of rebels were said
to be ‘burning and pillaging’ their way along Noto plateau, 30–40 km north
of Lindi and just west of the coastal belt.99 South of Noto lay Milola, whence
the Maji was taken to some of the villages in western Mwera country
that participated in the sacking of the mission stations at Nyangao and
Lukuledi.100 In the Milola area the ﬁrst German military expedition from
Lindi had its ﬁrst serious encounter with the rebels.101 At the end of 1905,
Goetzen claimed that the coastal hinterland from Lindi to the Mbemkuru
was the only area within Lindi district to have suﬀered serious damage from
the uprising.
The thrust of the rebellion, then, was not merely against ‘communal
shambas’ and colonial forced labour, but against the encroachment of coastal
landownership and labour relations in whatever guise. Some of the par-
ticipants were self-conscious, self-assertive ‘backwoodsmen’ defending an
independent way of life, looting and striking back against coastal people.
This is true for the Matumbi, who had so long held on to their independence
in spite of their proximity to Kilwa. It is also evident in Libaba’s102 account
of the warriors from western Mwera country on their way to Nyangao,
robbing every trader they could ﬁnd. Moreover, the attacks on the mission
stations and on Mroweka all have this character.
Yet majumbe from the area bordering on, but not controlled by, the plan-
tation economy were also involved in the ﬁghting. The mosaic of loyal and
rebellious administrators in the Mavuji area, where German troops had to
protect the former against the latter, was not exceptional.Majumbe from the
coastal hinterland served in the ﬁrst German expedition from Lindi.103
German records list payments to loyal local leaders, and prizes paid to those
who captured rebels.104 In Kilwa, one ‘Swahili ’ person, a headhunter for the
government, delivered two rebel leaders to the Germans within a space of
weeks.105 Saidi Makanjira, the Yao with relatives in Kilwa who had tried to
settle as a planter amidst up country people, reportedly shot himself after the
Maji had been forced on him. The uprising tore apart existing economic and
political networks. This polarization among local leaders may partly explain
the persistence of ﬁghting even at times when the German forces were bound
up elsewhere.
The particular problems of the Liwale area help to illuminate this argu-
ment. In part, the protracted ﬁghting here had the same cause as the area’s
earlier pre-eminence as a target for Ngoni raids; it lay on a major route, this
time of German troops to the interior. But the scramble for opportunity
had been particularly intense here during the preceding eight years, since the
99 Goetzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 85. 100 MMRP 7/69/1/1.
101 Jacob B. Nyangali, Habari za Wamwera (Ndanda, 1990), 61–3; MMRP 7/68/1/1.
102 MMRP 7/68/2/1. 103 Ibid.
104 District Oﬃcer Ewerbeck, Lindi, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 18 Oct.
1905, TNA G3/70, 58.
105 District Oﬃce, Kilwa, to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 24 Feb. 1906 and
22 Mar. 1906, TNA G3/70, 297, 317.
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subjection of the Ngoni in 1897, because of a high level of political frag-
mentation and competition for leadership. Oral tradition holds that local
leaders from Liwale asked the Germans to build a military station in their
area for protection against Ngoni raids, and that several of them, including
future Maji rebels, proﬁted greatly from cooperation with the Germans.106
On the other hand, they eventually began to resent the limits the German
presence put on their ambitions. Thus, the uprising in Liwale fed oﬀ the
tensions surrounding this struggle for opportunity, overshadowed by the
increasingly felt German presence and the threat of a return of the Ngoni
raiders.
Iliﬀe has stated that Ngindo from Liwale became the most dedicated
supporters of Maji Maji.107 Their attempts to promote unity among the
rebels are understandable in the light of the area’s vulnerability to attacks by
African neighbours as well as German troops. According to Iddi Kinjalla,
grandson of the hongo (Maji messenger) Omari Kinjalla, who carried the
Maji from Liwale to Ungoni, Ngindo leaders were aware of the danger of
Ngoni raiders returning to attack Liwale when they made the decision to
rebel. They sought to recruit Ngoni as allies in an attempt to avert this out-
come.108 The ﬁgure of Omar Kinjalla, who carried theMaji to the Ngoni, was
emblematic. He took on his mission only under threat of death from fellow
rebels in Liwale. Yet once in Ungoni, he asserted his role as prophet actively,
donning special robes and commanding various privileges, including a large
share of the loot. As the rebellion began to founder, he tried to maintain his
role by increasingly extravagant promises of the successes his powers would
secure. Eventually he was killed by his Ngoni followers. With its mixture of
prophecy and cynicism, his career exempliﬁes the extremes of vulnerability
and dogged self-assertion that had characterized his home region in the
period before the rebellion.
THE ROLE OF THE MAJI
The questions that have been raised in the 1990s about the importance of
Maji aimed above all to dispel the suggestion of a consciously super-tribal
and anti-colonial ‘ ideology of Maji Maji’. Nevertheless, the role of Maji
in the rebellion remains an important issue. The questions surrounding it
concern its origins and meanings as well the ways it was spread and used,
especially the role of the original prophets. A separate paper would be re-
quired to do full justice to the elements of cultural continuity and innovation,
of local tradition and unifying ideology in theMaji and of local improvisation
and far-reaching coordination in its cult. But most important here is the role
of the Maji in galvanizing political tensions and the way it related to the
particular political practice of the big men.
106 Interviews with Mzee Chande Hassan Kigwalilo, Liwale, 11 Oct. 2000, with Iddi
Abdallah Omari Kinjalla and Mzee Mpunga, Liwale, 12 Oct. 2000.
107 Iliﬀe,Modern History, 172.
108 Interview with Mzee Iddi Abdallah Omari Kinjalla, Liwale, 12 Oct. 2000;
on Kinjalla’s career also R. M. Bell, ‘The Maji Maji uprising in the Liwale district ’,
Tanganyika Notes and Records, 42 (1950), 38–57.
TRADERS, ‘B IG MEN’ AND PROPHETS 19
In describing the aims of the Maji Maji rebels in terms of decades-old
political tensions, the present study concurs with those by Monson and
Wright. But it disagrees with their minimizing the importance of Kinjikitile,
the best-known prophet of the Maji, and of his shrine at Ngarambi and
others nearby.While long-running tensions in the region made conﬂict in the
course of the imposition of German control likely, the extent and intensity of
the uprising are impossible to explain without the Maji and its messengers.
As outlined above, Southeast Tanzania was very fragmented politically.
Relations among local leaders and between them and the colonial adminis-
tration were ambiguous, changeable and pragmatic. They did not present
a clear-cut opposition of colonizers against colonized. At least in the South-
east, it took a catalyst, i.e. the Maji and hongomessengers from the shrine, to
transform these manifold tensions into widespread war.109
To understand the eﬀectiveness of Maji as a means of mobilization in
Southeast Tanzania, it must be acknowledged that Maji, as a medicine, was a
carrier of a multitude of social meanings. As recent studies have emphasized,
while the Maji medicine was a weapon, similar medicines were also used for
crop protection, for healing and harming, to explain the rootlessness of slaves
and to explain and legitimate the power of big men.110 Medicines came from
the forest. They were products of the wild, originating at the margins of
society. While big men were credited with the ability to extract strong
medicines from the wilderness, they did not have exclusive control of such
resources. Maji was a case in point. It was a resource that circulated outside
the big men’s established networks and could be spread by visionaries and
self-appointed prophets. It could speak without mediation by big men to
people from all sections of the societies of the interior.
An indication of the Maji’s popular appeal was the millenarian enthusiasm
that accompanied it. The gatherings at Ngarambi, Kinjikitile’s shrine, were
held in a spirit of intense anticipation. It was said that visitors to Kinjikitile
had seen their ancestors. There was also talk of all people becoming freemen
after the uprising: ‘we will all be the Sayyid Said’s’.111Also, mass conversions
to Islam preceded the rebellion in Liwale and parts of Mwera country.112
109 It should also be noted that the timing of the ﬁrst attack on Kibata suggests an
element of planning: it occurred after Kinjikitile’s arrest, but before his hanging, i.e. at a
time when his supporters had a lot to win by liberating him. See the account of the
sequence of events in Otto Stollowsky, ‘On the background to the rebellion in German
East Africa’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21 (1988), 677–96.
110 Gilbert Gwassa, ‘African methods of warfare during the Maj Maji war’, in Bethwell
A. Ogot (ed.), War and Society in Africa (London, 1972), 123–49, has the fullest dis-
cussion of the Maji as war medicine. Wright, ‘Maji Maji’, and Sunseri, ‘Famine and wild
pigs’, emphasize its protective and healing aspects. On the uses of Maji by elders, inter-
view with Mzee Ibrahim Nassoro Bakari Kimbegu, Rwangwa, 18 Nov. 2000; with Shehe
Ali Hassan Mnajilo, Mnacho-Ng’au, 20 Nov. 2000.
111 Iliﬀe, Modern History, 169. The expectation of the coming of the Sayyid’s govern-
ment is also mentioned in ‘Die Reise des hochwuerdigen Herrn Bischof Thomas Spreiter
nach Matumbi und Kwiro’, Missionsblaetter von St Ottilien, 13 (1909), 51–66, 81–7,
97–123.
112 Bezirksnebenstelle (Sub-District Oﬃce), Liwale to Colonial Government, Dar es
Salaam, 5 Dec. 1912, TNA G 9/48, 93; Thaddeus Sunseri, ‘Maji Maji and the millen-
nium: Abrahamic sources and the creation of a Tanzanian resistance tradition’,History in
Africa, 26 (1993), 365–78.
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This readiness to embrace Islam while attacking Muslim intermediaries of
colonial rule indicates that people in the interior hoped to achieve something
better than the status quo ante by participating in the rebellion. They wanted
to acquire a new status, deﬁned with reference to coastal society, as Muslim
freemen. In this manner, ‘backwoodspeople’, ordinary villagers, displayed
their awareness of the context in which the big men operated and expressed
the hope of using it to their own ends.
For the big men, Maji could be both a means to assert their authority
and a threat to it. Oral sources from the southeast describe two ways of
obtaining it : through hongo messengers and through the initiative of
established local leaders who went to the shrines to fetch it and applied it to
their followers. Hongo, messengers of Maji, most of whom originated from
or had visited the original Maji shrines on the Ruﬁji River, spread the call
to arms and were closely involved in organizing the ﬁghting all across the
area considered here. Many hongo were obscure ﬁgures. Informants from
the southern Mwera plateau described a short, red-eyed, ﬁerce man known
only by his title, who had arrived from Matumbi via Milola in the
immediate coastal hinterland.113 In the Ilulu area in northwestern Mwera
country, although ﬁve well-established local leaders are said to have
obtained Maji directly from Kinjikitile,114 the chief hongo was someone
diﬀerent, a man named Mnwele. He was vaguely related to Selemani
Mamba.115 This was a general pattern: while experienced local leaders led
ﬁghting, the experts on Maji were diﬀerent people.116 One informant said
that he was administered by the Maji twice, once by his father, and once by
Selemani Mamba.117 Here it appears that Selemani Mamba had to recapture
the initiative by repeating under his own aegis a ritual that someone else
had already performed. Big men like Mamba, having built their position on
providing protection against Ngoni and other threats, and accustomed to
the use of demonstrative force, could scarcely aﬀord to ignore an oppor-
tunity such as the Maji. Commoners were well placed to force them into
action. Waging war had long been part of what made a big man, so that
Selemani Mamba probably did not need much persuading. Still, the
elusiveness – from a big man’s point of view – and accessibility – from that
of other aspiring leaders – of Maji might have made it diﬃcult for him to
stay out of the war. By extension, the dynamism of the Maji’s spread may
be understood as an eﬀect of the eﬀorts of many big men and would-be big
men to stay ahead of each other.
Diverging opinions on who started the war – locals or strangers, leaders
or commoners – are an intriguing aspect of later accounts of the uprising. In
Liwale, records collected during the colonial period ﬁrmly place the blame
with local majumbe, some of whom were said to have forced reluctant
followers into war with the threat of death.118 Later accounts described the
113 MMR P7/69/1/1 and 2/1. 114 MMRP 7/68/1/1.
115 Interview with Issa Makolela, Rwangwa 18 Nov. 2000.
116 District Oﬃce Kilwa to Colonial Government, Dar es Salaam, 24 Feb. 1906, TNA
G3/70; Iliﬀe,Modern History, 168–202. 117 MMRP 7/68/2/2.
118 Bell, ‘The Maji Maji uprising’, 45.
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decision to go to war as much more consensual.119 In Mwera country, it
was easy to blame strangers, i.e. Ngindo, but beyond that there is very
little agreement on who fought the war and what it was about.120 The
change in Liwale reﬂects the informants’ deference to the political con-
text; they could not be expected to tell colonial oﬃcials that the rebellion
had popular support. But the vagueness of later claims as to who fought
and why also echoes the ambiguity characterizing the relationship of big
men and their followers.
CONCLUSION
TheMaji Maji rebellion has been connected to the struggle for independence
as well as to precolonial, domestic and symbolic struggles. The argument
above further highlights two debates: on East Africa’s intensifying relations
with the wider world on the eve of colonial occupation and on the encounter
between the colonial state and local African politics. The rebellion was in
part an attack of the interior on the coast, but it did not just pit conservative
‘backwoodspeople’ against forces of change from the coast. It was so forceful
because all sides in it, rebels and loyalists, leaders and commoners, had long
been involved in networks of control that connected the coast and the
interior. Here, the rebellion illustrates the depth of the region’s involvement
with the forces of the wider world before colonization, the struggle to use
and manipulate them and the deep-seated ambiguity in the relations of this
region with the forces from beyond its borders.
The uprising also highlighted the ambiguity in the relations between big
men and their followers. Hope, fear and cynicism were inextricably mixed in
the motivation of the rebels. While the fates and roles of local leaders in the
rebellion were very mixed, the history of the rebellion underscores the im-
portance of distinguishing between statelessness and the absence of political
leadership. The rebellion did not occur simply because the stateless people
of the interior were born rebels or because social tensions ran high. It took
the Maji to transform manifold tensions and discontent into action. Once
started, the rebellion polarized the networks through which the big men had
exercised their personal control over their followers, forcing them to take
sides. In eﬀect, the Maji Maji rebellion ended the era of independent big
men. Still, it did not do away with all the elements of precolonial big man
politics, such as the disdain for dynastic authority and the importance of
personal networks. This was part of the heritage that this region carried over
into the colonial period.
119 Mr Buru, Aﬁsa wa Utamaduni, ‘Wamagingo Wapinga Kutawaliwa na Wageni
Liwale’, Liwale, District Oﬃce of Culture, c. 1980; interview with Mzee Chande Hassan
Kigwalilo, Liwale, 11 Oct. 2000; with Mzee Iddi Abdallah Omari Kinjalla, Liwale,
12 Oct. 2000.
120 E.g. interviews with Tekla Abdalla Ngajuwe, Mnacho-Chimbila, 31 Aug. 2000;
with Paulo Silverster Mbunda, Mnero-Ngongo, 13 Sept. 2000, with Madina Omari
Ngaweje, Mnero-Kipara, 23 Sept. 2000.
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